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       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4358 
___________ 
 
CARLOS MUHAMMAD, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 
SUPERINTENDENT SOMERSET SCI; DAVID L. ONSTEAD, Unit Manager; SGT. L. 
MYERS-SMITH, C.O.; KEYSER, CO.; I. LICHTENFELS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 13-cv-00085) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 12, 2015 
Before: FUENTES, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  August 6, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                                                
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Carlos Muhammad, a Pennsylvania prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order 
of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granting a 
motion to dismiss his civil rights action.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 Muhammad filed a complaint against prison officials and staff alleging that his 
cellmate, Gordon Davis, repeatedly violated the prison’s non-smoking policy and 
threatened him with bodily harm.  He averred that Officer Keyser heard the threats and 
did nothing.  Muhammad filed grievances complaining about Davis’ smoking and threats, 
but stated that he “received no positive response.”  On September 20, 2011, Davis 
allegedly spoke with Sergeant Myers-Smith.  Davis then asked Muhammad why he told 
Sergeant Myers-Smith that he was smoking in the cell.  Davis then assaulted Muhammad.   
 Muhammad alleged that Sergeant Myers-Smith and Officer Lichtenfels heard his 
conversation with Davis, and that Officers Lichtenfels and Keyser intervened.  
Muhammad needed three stitches.  He alleged that a hearing officer found him guilty of 
fighting back based on the false testimony of prison staff and sanctioned him to 60 days 
of confinement in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”).  Muhammad alleged that he was 
later exonerated and that Davis was found solely responsible for the assault.   
 Muhammad claimed that the assault was caused by the negligence of Sergeant 
Myers-Smith and the other defendants, who also violated his Eighth Amendment and due 
process rights.  Muhammad asserted that Sergeant Myers-Smith disregarded his 
complaints about Davis, told Davis that he had complained about his smoking, and 
thereby exposed him to a substantial risk of harm.  He asserted that Sergeant Myers-
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Smith and Officer Lichtenfels knew an altercation would transpire because they were 
listening to his conversation with Davis. 
 Sergeant Myers-Smith and Officers Keyser and Lichtenfels moved to dismiss the 
complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.1  The defendants submitted 
copies of Muhammad’s grievance related to the September 20, 2011 assault, the 
grievance coordinator’s denial of the grievance as untimely and without merit, 
Muhammad’s appeal to the Superintendent, and the Superintendent’s response upholding 
the response of the grievance coordinator.  The defendants also submitted a grievance 
officer’s affidavit attesting that Muhammad did not appeal the Superintendent’s response 
to the Secretary’s Office, the final level of administrative review.   
 The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation to 
grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint.  Based on the documents 
submitted, the District Court concluded that Muhammad had procedurally defaulted his 
claims by failing to properly exhaust his administrative remedies.  The District Court 
found, among other things, that Muhammad’s first level grievance was untimely and that 
he did not submit a final level appeal.  Thereafter, the District Court received 
Muhammad’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report and/or response to the motion 
                                                                
1Muhammad also named Gerald Wetzel, John Rozum, and David Onstead as defendants.  
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss 
Muhammad’s claims against these defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
because they were sued solely in their supervisory capacities.  Muhammad does not 
challenge this ruling in his brief on appeal.  
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to dismiss.  The District Court reached the same decision after review of Muhammad’s 
filing.  Muhammad now appeals. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our standard of review is 
plenary.  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a prisoner to exhaust available 
administrative remedies before bringing an action regarding prison conditions.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(a); Small v. Camden County, 728 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013).  Failure to 
exhaust is an affirmative defense that the defendant must plead and prove.  Small, 728 
F.3d at 268.  Under § 1997e(a), a prisoner must properly exhaust such remedies by 
complying with the prison grievance system’s procedural rules.  Woodford v. Ngo, 548 
U.S. 81, 93-95 (2006); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).  The record 
reflects that Muhammad’s grievance was found untimely and without merit, and that 
Muhammad did not file a final level appeal.   
 Muhammad argues on appeal that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirements were 
satisfied because he contacted the police regarding the assault and, as a result, his claim 
became a “Commonwealth matter.”  Appellant’s Br. at 3.  This argument lacks merit. 
Muhammad does not otherwise challenge the District Court’s ruling that he did not 
properly exhaust his administrative remedies.2  
                                                                
2Muhammad does not challenge the District Court’s conclusion that it was unnecessary to 
convert the motion to dismiss to a summary judgment motion to decide the question of 
exhaustion and we thus do not consider this issue. 
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 Muhammad also contends that the District Court erred in finding his objections to 
the Magistrate Judge’s report untimely.  The record reflects, however, that the District 
Court considered Muhammad’s objections.  After the District Court adopted the 
Magistrate Judge’s report, the District Court issued another Memorandum Order stating 
that the objections did not change its decision. 
 Finally, Muhammad asserts in his brief that the defendants violated his due 
process rights by housing him in the RHU when he was not guilty of fighting.3  To the 
extent Muhammad’s complaint can be construed as raising such a claim, Muhammad 
does not state a claim for violation of his due process rights based on his confinement in 
the RHU.  See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995) (discipline in segregated 
confinement did not present type of atypical, significant deprivation creating a liberty 
interest). 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.4      
                                                                
3Muhammad initially alleged in his complaint that he was sanctioned to 60 days in the 
RHU, but he states in his brief that he was confined there for 30 days. 
 
4Muhammad’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 
147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
